

Message Text

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ACTION SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 W
----- 098239

O 111414Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6288

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2209

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR KEATING FROM CHARGE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS
SUBJ: COMPILATION OF ISRAELI STATEMENTS

REF: STATE 81489

1. SUMMARY. WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY RECENT STATEMENTS BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS RE WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO JUNE 1967 BORDERS, WITH MINOR RECTIFICATIONS, IN RETURN FOR A) NON-BELLIGERENCY, OR B) PEACE (EXCEPT IN CASE OF FEW UNINFLUENTIAL MK'S OF LEFTIST ORIENTATION). THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF PRESS SPECULATION RE POSSIBLE RETURN TO 1967 BORDERS, BUT DEGREE TO WHICH THESE MAY REFLECT OFFICIAL THINKING IS UNCLEAR AS IS THEIR IMPACT ON PUBLIC THINKING. END SUMMARY.

2. MOST PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY TOP ISRAELI OFFICIALS CARRY BASICALLY NEGATIVE TONE RE GENERAL QUESTION OF RETURN TO 1967 BORDERS, TONE SET BY FORMULATION USED BY RABIN IN HIS MAIDEN SPEECH TO KNESSET AS PRIME MINISTER ON JUNE 2, 1974: "...ISRAEL WILL NOT RETURN--EVEN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A PECE TREATY--TO THE 4 JUNE 1967 LINES. THESE LINES ARE NOT DEFENSIBLE BORDERS.."

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3. ALTERNATIVE, AND SLIGHTLY MORE FORTHCOMING, FORMULATION WAS USED BY RABIN ON ISRAELI TELEVISION SEPT 20, 1974: "...IF THERE WERE, HOWEVER, A REAL PROSPECT OF REACHING TRUE PEACE WITH ONE OR MORE ARAB COUNTRIES, I WOULD

FAVOR A COMPROMISE, AND PERHAPS EVEN A FAR-REACHING COMPROMISE.." SIMILARLY, ALLON AT UNGA ON OCT 3, 1974 SAID: "ISRAL (FOR PEACE) WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO A SIGNIFICANT TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE, BUT SHE CANNOT COMPROMISE ON HER SECURITY."

4. CLOSEST ANY SENIOR OSRAELI OFFICIAL HAS COME TO SUGGESTING ACCEPTABILITY OF ONLY MINOR MODIFICATIONS IN 1967 BORDERS WAS RABIN STATEMENT IN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED BY MAARIV SEPT 25, 1974; "...ISRAEL WILL NOT AGREE TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT THAT DOES NOT PROMISE A GENUINE AND COMPLETE PEACE AND DOES NOT INCLUDE DEFENSIBLE BORDERS. THESE BORDERS CANNOT BE IDENTICAL TO THE LINES THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE SIX DAY WAR.."

5. MOST RECENT REFERENCE TO 1967 BORDERS BY SENIOR OFFICIAL OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE CAME IN SPEECH BY RABIN, SPEAKING AT ISRAEL BONDS CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 27, IN WHICH HE WAS QUOTED AS SAYING: "WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE MUCH TERRITORY IN RETURN FOR PEACE, BUT EVEN IN RETURN FOR PEACE WE SHALL NOT RETURN TO THE BORDERS OF JUNE 4, 1967."

6. AS YOU ARE AWARE, ONE OF DIFFICULTIES IS THAT ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM '67 LINES IS NOT USUALLY POSED IN GENERAL TERMS, AND DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SINAI, GOLAN AND WEST BANK ARE ALMOST ALWAYS MADE EXPLICIT OR IMPLIED. (GOVERNMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, IS COMMITTED TO GOING TO ELECTORATE BEFORE ANY WEST BANK WITHDRAWAL, COMMITMENT WHICH DOES NOT EXIST IN OTHER TWO CASES.) PERES AND OTHERS HAVE SPOKEN OF GIVING UP "BULK OF" SINAI IN RETURN FOR BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR "NON-BELLIGERENCY" AND WOULD GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN. A FEW ISRAELIS, INCLUDING GENERAL SHARON AND MOSHE DAYAN, SECRET

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HAVE SUGGESTED THAT GOLAN MIGHT BE GIVEN UP UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. WE KNOW OF NO STATEMENTS BY PROMINENT ISRAELIS INDICATING THAT ALL OF WEST BANK WOULD BE GIVEN UP, EVEN IN RETURN FOR PEACE.

7. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, ISRAELI PRESS HAS BEEN MORE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN SPECULATION, SOME OF WHICH MAY BE PROMPTED BY OFFICIAL EFFORTS TO ASCERTAIN HOW MUCH TRAFFIC PUBLIC OPINION WILL BEAR. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS REGARD IS APRIL 1 ARTICLE IN HAARETZ (SCHWEITZER), WHICH IS WIDELY REGARDED AS REFLECTING AT LEAST SPECULATIVE THINKING OF DEFMIN PERES. EXTRACT FROM ARTICLE FOLLOWS:

8. BEGIN QUOTE.

"THERE IS A PROPOSAL BY ISRAEL FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT ON ALL OF THE CEASE-FIRE LINES THAT WOULD REQUIRE RECOGNITION OF EGYPTIAN-JORDANIAN-SYRIAN RULE OVER OCCUPIED TERRITORY VIS-A-VIS RECOGNITION BY THESE COUNTRIES OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT OF RULE OVER WHAT'S LEFT, AND ALSO OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE. IT WOULD BE AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON STAGES OF IMPLEMENTATION ACCORDING TO A TIMETABLE FIXED IN ADVANCE; GUARANTEES BY THE SUPERPOWERS WOULD ADD EFFECT AND VALIDITY TO THE COMMITMENT OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED. SHIMON PERES, WHO CAME UP WITH A SIMILAR IDEA, CALLED IT THE "COUNTDOWN;" IT MEETS, AT LEAST PARTLY, SADAT'S DESIRE FOR AN ACCELERATION OF THE PROCESS.

"THE GREAT DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE "COUNT-DOWN" IS THAT IT NECESSITATES A DECISION CONCERNING THE GOLAN, AS WELL AS JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP. BUT THIS IS A DIFFICULTY WHICH CANNOT BE SHIRKED.." END QUOTE.

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6289

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EXDIS

FOR AMB KEATING FROM CHARGE

9. WE HAD OCCASION APRIL 6 TO DISCUSS ABOVE IDEAS WITH SCHWEITZER. HE CONFIRMED THAT HIS "PLAN" ENVISIONED WITHDRAWAL FROM BOTH GOLAN HEIGHTS AND WEST BANK AT SPECIFIED POINTS DURING "COUNT-DOWN". ASKED IF HE THOUGHT GOVERNMENT COULD SELL THIS TO PUBLIC, HE RESPONDED THAT THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO SELL WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK EXCEPT BY SELLING REAL PEACE AT SAME TIME. HE ADMITTED THAT PROBLEM WITH THIS SOLUTION IS THAT, FOR ISRAELI PURPOSES, IT MUST BE PHASED OVER TIME PERIOD OF ABOUT TEN YEARS AND HE WONDERS IF SADAT COULD ACCEPT THIS. HE REFUSED TO BE PINNED DOWN AS TO WHETHER THIS ELABORATION OF HIS ARTICLE REFLECTED THINK-

ING OF ANY GOI OFFICIALS.

10. THERE FOLLOW THREE ADDITIONAL ARTICLES WHICH ADDRESS QUESTION OF RETURN TO 1967 BORDERS. WE ARE UNAWARE OF EXTENT TO WHICH THEY MIGHT REFLECT OFFICIAL THINKING:

11. HAGGAI ESHED, WRITING JAN 6 IN ANTICIPATION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERIM ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN SETTLEMENT, SAID:
"..AS LONG AS THE US IS STRIVING TO SEEK PARTIAL IDF WITHDRAWALS IN RETURN FOR APPROPRIATE ARAB CONSIDERATIONS..ISRAEL SHOULD CONTINUE TO PREFER SOLE
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US MEDIATION..BUT IF THE US JOINS THE SOVIET AND DEMANDS A TOTAL IDF WITHDRAWAL TO THE JUNE 4, 1967 BORDERS..ISRAEL SHOULD PREFER GENEVA WHERE THE SOVIETS ARE CO-SPONSORS..THE SOVIETS WILL THEN HAVE A STRONGER INTEREST IN ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE..THIS IS THE LOGIC BEHIND GROMYKO'S STATEMENT AT THE OPENING OF GENEVA (DECEMBER 21, 1973) GUARANTEEING SOVIET SUPPORT FOR AN ISRAEL WITHIN JUNE 4, 1967 BOUNDARIES..GROMYKO THEN HOPED THAT ISRAEL WOULD APPRECIATE THE HINT CONCEALED IN THE PUBLIC SOVIET COMMITMENT.."

12. DR SHLOMO GROSS (POLES) SAYS IN JAN 24 HAARETZ:
"..WHOEVER SUPPORTS GOING TO GENEVA MUST REALIZE THAT HE HAS ACTUALLY ACCEPTED A RETURN TO THE JUNE 4, 1967 BOUNDARIES, OR AT LEAST ACCEPTED THIS DEMAND AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS..IT IS POSSIBLE TO ARGUE THAT WE ARE IN FOR THE SAME RESULT IF WE CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF PARTIAL AGREEMENTS UNDER US AUSPICES..AFTER ALL, IT IS POSSIBLE TO SAY THAT THE US POLICY IS ALSO SEEKING A RETURN TO JUNE 4, 1967 BOUNDARIES..WITH ONE DIFFERENCE..INSTEAD OF THREATS, THE US IS TALKING PERSUASIVELY.."

13. DAVAR (GEVA) WRITE ON FEB 5: "IT IS NO SECRET THAT THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION, MUCH AS THE LAST DEMOCRATIC ONE, THINKS IN TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE 1967 BORDERS. TO REJECT THIS, AS IS GENERALLY DONE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD MERELY MEAN RETURNING TO THE PRE-1967 SITUATION WITH ALL ITS RISKS, BEGS THE QUESTION: THE MORE-OR-LESS PRE-1967 BORDERS WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT WITH THE ARABS IS ONE THING, THE SAME BORDERS WITH A SETTLEMENT AND POSSIBLY WITH AMERICAN GUARANTEES WOULD BE SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AGAIN. AND IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO MAKE THE AMERICANS GIVE UP THE ROGERS PLAN--AND THERE HAVE BEEN MANY--HAVE ALL FAILED."

14. RE YOUR SPECIFIC QUERY CONCERNING STATEMENT BY

YAACOB, HIS ONLY STATEMENT IN RECENT MONTHS CONCERNING
DISPOSITION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF WHICH WE ARE
AWARE WAS DURING CONVERSATION WITH YOU ON DEC 2 (TEL
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AVIV 6967). AT THAT TIME, YAACOB SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL
COULD DISCUSS "NEW POLITICAL STATE" IN "WEST BANK AND
GAZA".
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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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